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Flood, Cook FADC and Deegan on Bali travel advice failure – a preliminary look at the issues ( and Brian Deegan’s main testimony) - commentary by Tony Kevin , 18 July 2004
We are now in the pre-spin phase of the Howard Government’s latest spin cycle, aimed to deflect blame from itself regarding the ministerial ignoring of relevant pre-Bali terrorist threat intelligence. Now that the election is nearly upon us, will a chivalrous ALP politely let the government off the hook on this ? Will our political system now tacitly agree to "move on" from our still raw community grieving over the more than 200 dead, including 88 Australians? The Prime Minister confirmed today that the unclassified version of the Flood review of the performance of governmental intelligence agencies is about to be published this week So the public will first read, a couple of weeks ahead of the long-delayed Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee investigation of "Security Threats to Australians in South-east Asia", now due to report to the Senate on 5 August 2004 after four postponements totalling14 months, what Phillip Flood has to say about this "case study" of intelligence agencies’ performance. The Senate FADC reference was triggered by public questions that just would not go away, as to why no consular travel advice was issued to Australians intending to holiday in Bali despite at least three Australian intelligence warnings to the Foreign Minister predicting a risk of terrorist attack on bars frequented by Westerners, in cities and resorts in Indonesia that corresponded pretty closely to the description of Bali. About 30,000 and upwards Australians used to congregate on holidays in Bali in any one week – making them a fairly important Australian security asset for our government to set out to protect, one would have thought. As the Chair (Senator Cook) commented at the first FADC meeting: ‘The issue of why Australians like us – 30,000 in Bali – were not singled out as a special Australian security interest, when the US was warning of threat to nightspots, has not yet been answered". For a year up until the Bali bombing, DFAT travel advisories kept on assuring travellers that tourist services to Bali were operating normally. The clear and commonsense implication to readers – airlines, travel agents, ordinary people - was that, whatever fine-tuning variations in travel advisories DFAT might be making for other parts of Indonesia, or for Indonesia as a whole, Bali was somehow immune – off limits to terrorism. It was as if Bali was in a different country - Holidayland. After the Bali tragedy happened, I was asked by ABC Current Affairs if I thought it should have been predicted by the Australian government. Intuitively, I said, no - I said that somehow we all thought "Bali was different". However, what I did not know then, but what is public knowledge now, was that Foreign Minister Downer had three times over the previous 13 months been confidentially warned by ONA and by ASIO, on the basis of their intelligence and assessments, that precisely this kind of attack was now a risk in places like Bali. That makes it a very different question. The web is now being spun over this uncomfortable fact in all kinds of drearily familiar ways. As so often with this government, its own serious policy failure to protect Australians is being dressed up as intelligence agency failure. All kinds of diversionary evidence has been trundled out in the FADC – for example, evidence of amazing discrepancies in bureaucratic memory between ONA and DFAT, about a meeting that ONA says took place in DFAT about a week after ONA gave one of the abovementioned warnings to the Minister, face to face in his Parliament House office, in mid-2002. On the last day of the FADC public hearings, ONA testified that they definitely went through the same briefing material in a named senior DFAT officer’s room ( Bill Paterson) with four other DFAT officers present, about a week after they saw Downer. DFAT – officially, through their spokesperson – says they have no record of any such meeting. Both agencies cannot be telling the truth. But does it really matter ? Surely the important fact is that ONA warned Minister Downer the week before that now disputed meeting in DFAT, and that he should have acted on that warning. Or maybe, this might now be about to be denied too ? Before Bali, ONA was not in the habit of keeping records of such internal briefing meetings with Ministers and departmental clients. What would they do now, if the Minister were to deny their recall of their briefing of him in his office? Also, there has been an amount of breast-beating admissions in testimony by ONA and ASIO that they had been too slow in 2001 and 2002 to twig that Jemaah Islamiah was developing a terrorist intention and capability. But again, I don’t see that as a central issue at all. Surely from the duty of care point of view, the issue is that ONA and ASIO had apparently properly warned the Foreign Minister of the possibility of a terrorist attack – whether by Al Qaeda, JI or whatever organisation - in places like Western bars in holiday resorts like Bali. The bombs would have the same lethal result whichever organisation was going to set them off. The job that was not done was to warn Australian holidaymakers that they were now in greater danger, visiting places like the Sari Club. As agency heads like Richardson and Varghese manfully take the blame for their alleged professional failures, are the real possible transgressors – Downer and his office minders, maybe DFAT – going to tiptoe away quietly into the night? We will have to wait and see what Flood and Cook’s FADC will have to say. We know now that the Flood report will include as a "case study" the intelligence history regarding Bali. Let us read it very carefully, and cross-reference it back to earlier media reports about the ignored intelligence warnings and the FADC Hansard. A big job, but one that must be done. Flood had at least one advantage over Cook. Flood was able to interview Howard, Downer, Hill, and Ruddock. Cook’s FADC was not – nor could they interview any of the abovementioned Ministers’ office staff.
HERE IS BASIC PUBLIC DATA ABOUT THE FADC INQUIRY, TAKEN FROM THE SENATE COMMITTEES AND HANSARD WEBSITES Terms of Reference: To inquire into and report on: The performance of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and other relevant agencies of the Commonwealth Government in the assessment and dissemination of threats to the security of Australians in South-East Asia in the period 11 September 2001 to 12 October 2002, including: a) The assessment made by DFAT and other relevant agencies of the Commonwealth Government of the threat to Australians in South-East Asia from al Qaeda (and associated terrorist organisations) prior to 11 September 2001 b) Any change in the assessment of the threat to Australians in South-East Asia from these terrorist organisations arising from the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 and the decision by Australia to participate in military actions with other coalition partners against al Qaeda in Afghanistan in November 2001. c) Any further changes in the assessment of the threat to Australians in South-East Asia from these terrorist organisations arising from the arrest and interrogation of the so-called ‘Singapore bombers’ in the period December 2001 to February 2002. d) Any further change in threat assessments to Australians in South-East Asia arising from the arrest and interrogation of Omar al-Faruq. e) Any subregional variations on the assessment of the threat to Australians in South-East Asia in the period 11 September 2001 to 12 October 2002, in particular within Indonesia including Jakarta and Bali. f) Any differences between the assessments of the threat made by DFAT and other related agencies of the Commonwealth Government agencies, and the assessments of the threat made by the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Singapore and Canada over the security of their nationals for the same period. g) Any differences between the assessments of the threat made by DFAT and other related agencies of the Commonwealth Government and the content of the travel advisories, embassy bulletins and travel bulletins provided by DFAT over the period 11 September 1002 and 12 October 2002. h) Any differences between DFAT travel advisories, travel bulletins and embassy bulletins between the period 11 September 2001 to 12 October 2002. i) DFAT’s conclusion on improvements to the dissemination of travel advisories, travel bulletins and embassy bulletins to the Australian travelling public in the future. Meetings held : Nine public FADC meetings were held on this reference:
Senators’ attendances: Most frequently attending these nine meetings were: Labor (chair): Cook 6, Kirk 7, Hutchins 2, Hogg 2 Coalition: Brandis 8, Johnston 7, Santoro 7 Democrats: Stott Despoja 4 Greens: Brown 5 (of which once by audio conference) History of postponements: FADC was first due to report by 26 June 2003. On 14 May 2003, the Senate extended the date to 4 November 2003. On 9 March 2004, Senate agreed to a further extension to 13 May 2004. On 30 March the Senate agreed that the time be extended to 24 June 2004. On 21 June 2004, the Senate agreed that the date be extended to 5 August 2004. Presumably there were legitimate evidentiary reasons for these unusually long delays. Submissions: As of 16 June 2003 (the latest date on Senate website), written submissions had been received from AFP, ASIO, ONA, DFAT (2), Confidential, and Mr Bruce Power (2)
Witnesses: 19 June 2003: RICHARDSON, Mr Dennis James, Director-General, ASIO 20 June 2003: BONIGHTON, Mr Ronald Bruce, Deputy Secretary, Intelligence and Security, Department of Defence FARMER, Mr David Michael John, Senior Analyst, Indonesia/East Timor, ONA GORDON, Dr Richard Alexander, Head, Pacific Branch, ONA JONES, Mr Kim, Director-General, ONA KEMISH, Mr Ian, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy, Consular and Passports Division, DFAT LEWINCAMP, Mr (Walter) Frank, Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence O’MALLEY, Dr William Joseph, Senior Analyst, Asia Branch, ONA ROACH, Mr Jeff, Director, Consular Information and Crisis Management Section, DFAT SMITH, Mr Rod, Assistant Secretary, Consular Branch, DFAT 24 September, 2003: BLICK, Mr William James, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security JONES, Mr Kim, Director-General, ONA KEMISH, Mr Ian, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy, Consular and Passport Division, DFAT O’MALLEY, Dr Bill, Assistant Director-General, ONA RICHARDSON, Mr Dennis, Director-General, ASIO ROACH, Mr Jeff, Director, Consular Information Section, Consular Branch, DFAT 25 September, Adelaide: Senators in attendance: Brandis, Brown, Cook (chair) , Johnston, Kirk and Stott Despoja. WITNESSES BONYTHON-WRIGHT, Mr David Thomas, (Private capacity) BURTON, Mr Julian Andre, Player, Sturt Football Club DEEGAN, Mr Brian, (Private capacity) MARSHALL, Mr David Grant, (Private capacity) WHITEMAN, Mr Andrew John Donald, Player, Sturt Football Club WOODGATE, Miss Leanne, (Private capacity) WOODGATE, Miss Samantha, (Private capacity) 20 November 2003 BABBAGE, Professor Ross E., Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University DEEGAN, Mr Brian, (Private capacity) HATTON, Mr Michael Stewart, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Federation of Travel Agents WILLIAMS, Mr Clive, (Private capacity) WRIGHT-NEVILLE, Dr David Peter, (Private capacity) 27 November 2003 BORGU, Mr Aldo, Program Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute WHITE, Mr Hugh John, Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute 28 November 2003 ASHTON, Mr Graham Leonard, General Manager Counter-Terrorism, AFP BONIGHTON, Mr Ronald Bruce, Deputy Secretary, Intelligence and Security, Department of Defence KEMISH, Mr Ian, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy, Consular and Passports Division, DFAT LEWINCAMP, Mr Frank, Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence PATERSON, Mr William, First Assistant Secretary, South and South-East Asia Division, DFAT ROACH, Mr Jeff, Director, Consular Information Section, Consular Branch, DFAT SMITH, Mr Richard Campbell, Former Australian Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia SMITH, Mr Rod, Assistant Secretary, Consular Branch, DFAT WARDLAW, Dr Grant, General Manager Intelligence, AFP 28 May 2004 , Canberra ASKEW, Mr Geoffrey David, Head of Group Security, Qantas Airways Ltd BONIGHTON, Mr Ronald Bruce, Deputy Secretary, Intelligence and Security, Department of Defence FARMER, Mr David Michael John, Senior Analyst, South-East Asia Branch, ONA KEMISH, Mr Ian, AM, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy, Consular and Passports Division, DFAT LEWINCAMP, Mr Frank, Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence O’MALLEY, Dr William Joseph, Assistant Director-General, South-East Asia Branch, ONA PATERSON, Mr Bill, PSM, First Assistant Secretary, South and South-East Asia Division, DFAT RICHARDSON, Mr Dennis James, Director-General, ASIO ROACH, Mr Jeff, Former Director, Consular Information and Crisis Management Section, DFAT VARGHESE, Mr Peter Joseph, Director-General, ONA 23 June 2004, Canberra FARMER, Mr David Michael John, Senior Analyst, South-East Asia Branch, ONA GORDON, Mr Richard Alexander, Former Branch Head, Pacific Branch, ONA VARGHESE, Mr Peter, Director General, ONA The Chair (Senator Hutchins, Labor) said on 23 June (Hansard FAD&T 507): "Today the committee is holding what it expects to be its last public hearing into the assessment and dissemination of threats to the security of Australians in South-East Asia during the period 11 September 2001 to 12 October 2002. The committee expects to table its report before 5 August" I’m going to finish this initial commentary – in which I am aware of my legal obligations to fully respect Senate privilege - by providing readers of my website with the text of Brian Deegan’s main testimony on 25 September 2003 - nearly one year ago. Deegan testified after four meetings of FADC had been held, at which all the official players - ASIO, Defence, ONA, DFAT, and the Director-General of Intelligence and Security - had given their initial testimonies. Deegan’s testimony merits a careful and respectful reading now, as the public release of the Flood and Cook FADC reports approaches. I think I will probably have more to write on this issue as I study the Hansards of the nine meetings in more detail, and as the Flood and FADC reports become public. If my experience of SIEV X has taught me one thing, it is – when looking at really important matters like this, one ought to go back to the initial testimonies. Tony Kevin 18 July 2004 BRIAN DEEGAN’S TESTIMONY ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2003 IN ADELAIDE FAD&T 236 [12.15 p.m.] CHAIR—Mr Deegan, welcome to the table. Mr Deegan—Thank you, Mr Chairman. CHAIR—I do not know if you were here earlier when we announced what the procedure was but we have invited witnesses to address us in summary on their concerns and then to be available for questions. Mr Deegan—Yes . CHAIR—And when the witness commences, we are inviting you to introduce yourself and whoever else you have with you at the table. Mr Deegan—Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. Just to preface anything that I have to say, I noticed a facsimile that I received this morning, part of which suggested that any submission that I make or anybody else makes should last about five minutes. I do wish to seek the chair’s latitude in that regard. I will attempt always to be as brief as I possibly can. Quite frankly, I could keep the committee going another five hours but I do not intend to destroy the rest of your day. But, having said that, I respectfully ask for latitude. CHAIR—I think the five minutes is meant for guidance. It is not a mandatory provision. Mr Deegan—Thank you. CHAIR—It is meant to point to the fact that we encourage people to be succinct but to deliver what they have to say before us. Mr Deegan—I will be as succinct as I possibly can. Before I commence, Senators, I do wish to introduce some people to this inquiry. I firstly wish to introduce Joshua’s mother, who is seated at the back, and Joshua’s stepfather, who is seated next to her. I would like to introduce my wife, Virginia, who is seated towards the back; I would like to introduce my son, Nicholas, who is seated towards the back; I would like to introduce my daughter, Eloise, who is seated towards the back; and I would like to introduce my youngest son, Patrick, who is seated with me. I would further like for the Senate inquiry to have a glimpse of the one child that I do not have but, not 12 months ago, I did have. I think it is important, Senators, that I give you this warning: I intend dividing my submission up into areas that I think are of concern to this inquiry, to this government, to Australia but, more importantly, to my family. To know a little bit about where I am coming from, you need to know a little bit about me. I am 48 years old. I have been a magistrate for 15 years. I was a solicitor prior to that for nearly 10 years, and I have been a father for over 23 years. In addition to law, I have the following qualifications: I am a licensed builder, I am a licensed building supervisor, I Thursday, 25 September 2003 Senate—References FAD&T 237 am a licensed junior karate instructor, I am a licensed football coach and I have engaged over the years in designing and building furniture. I put myself through university; my father, who fought and subsequently died for the country, retired. Since my teenage years I have had a dream. As I got towards my 20s, I met Angela, and she shared that dream. When I was 25 and one week, my dream was realised. Angela gave birth to Joshua on 20 February 1980. Since that day, we have lived that dream. We have followed every movement that Joshua has made. We have been with him each time he has been injured and we have been with him each time he has made achievements, but we were not with him when he subsequently died. This was Joshua’s first trip away from the family. He and his brother, Nicholas, had travelled once out of this country and that was with their mother when they were about 10 and eight respectively. They went to Bali, which was a safe haven, and I paid some of the moneys contributed. I, for one, have never been out of this country, nor sought to travel. I am not a person who has been involved in computers. I do not know how to really look up the Internet. I rely very heavily on the information that I receive, as do most people in this country, through news reports and television. When Joshua left, which was on the Friday, the 11th, he came to my home. The last words I said to Joshua as he drove out of my driveway were, ‘Be careful. There are people in that part of the region that no longer like Westerners. Do not drink Bali water and, above all, do not end up in a Bali hospital.’ He left. Not 30 hours later, the boy that is depicted in that photograph, the flagship of my family, was taken from me. He was butchered, and for three weeks thereafter he lay unattended in some Bali morgue, while I waited. He left Australia in one piece, with one bag and on one flight. He has been returned to me in piecemeal fashion. I received his bag with some of his goods. We waited. I received part or most of his body. Having been told on the Monday morning that he had been killed, two days later we were advised that he was not dead. We had to wait, and it was another 10 days after that that we were advised he was in fact dead. Thereafter, I have received parcel post deliveries by this government. I have received him back in piecemeal fashion. I warned Joshua about what I knew to be the case in Indonesia. I warned him because, since the government has taken office, I have had a keen interest—I have watched the thrust for an elevation in Australia’s position in world affairs. I have watched as this government has diverted moneys from the health and welfare systems to the military, and I have watched whilst Australia embarked on the liberation of East Timor, a Muslim country. I have watched as Australia then embarked on the capture of Osama bin Laden through a Muslim country. I have watched as Australia blockaded Iraq from 1990, part of that blockade being responsible for the deaths of some 5,000 children per month, and I have watched as Australia thereafter sought to re-enter Iraq. All of these are Muslim countries. I knew—as I believe the government would have known—that, despite the debate as to whether these incursions were right or wrong, somebody somewhere was going to dislike Australia. We have called all of the deaths of innocent children, men, women, fathers collateral damage. That is precisely what they could call my son—collateral damage. I knew, as many others did, as ASIO did, that the more we embarked upon our new military way, the more there would be reprisals. Whether we liked it or not, whether we were being honest with the world or not, whether we had the right to do it or not, I do not wish to debate. That is not why I am here. The FAD&T 238 Senate—References Thursday, 25 September 2003 reality is, however, that many Muslims in many countries did not agree with what we were doing. It is therefore, Mr Chair—and it is my opinion only—a reckless manner in which the government was taking Australia. When this occurred it seemed to me that the government, in adopting its reckless policies, was likewise adopting a reckless manner of dealing with those policies. The fact that there was an explosion—the fact that young Australian children were killed, maimed, their lives destroyed—was not a surprise to me at all. What was a surprise to me is that it occurred in Bali. Joshua would never have gone—would never have left these shores—had I known for one moment that Bali was a possible haven for terrorism. Unlike some fathers, I love my children. Unlike some fathers who do not mind being away from their children at length, I do. Over the course of the last 15 years when I have had to attend on circuits, I have driven home in the middle of the night—middle of the week—so that I could wake up with my children. I have coached Joshua, I have coached Nicholas, I have coached Eloise and I have coached Patrick. I have been coaching football and basketball for some 12 years. I was paid back for those achievements immediately after Bali occurred when I drove past Patrick’s then primary school and my entire year 6 and year 7 team ran to the fence just because it was Brian driving past. That is the difference between how I deal with my family and how others might deal with theirs, but it is important that you note it, because Joshua is not here to answer the questions of whether he might go or might not go. You can rest assured that he would not have gone. Bali is a Hindu island, removed from the balance of Indonesia, which is Muslim. Bali is a fun-loving haven for Australian children. As a result of this incident in Bali, the Prime Minister was questioned on 18 October whilst in Bali. It was suggested to the Prime Minister that there had been failings in our intelligence, that there had been failings in the office of foreign affairs. The Prime Minister answered those questions by saying, ‘It will be up to the Australian public to determine whether or not there have been failings in that department.’ Following that, the Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook a very brief review—within a matter of days—and on 18 October, after review, he said that there was nothing specific to Bali that could have prevented this incident. The Prime Minister has continually said, both in parliament and out, that there was nothing specific that could have prevented this incident in Bali. I accept those words. I accept that the Australian intelligence service did not know that eight minutes and 31 seconds past 11 o’clock Bali time on 12 October a bomb would explode outside the Sari Club, thereby killing my child. I accept that. If I did not accept that, I would have already launched criminal proceedings. What I sought immediately after this incident was an inquiry. Senator Bob Brown sought an inquiry. Others sought an inquiry. What inquiry took place? An inquiry launched by the Prime Minister with one person in the intelligence services, Mr Bill Blick. That inquiry and its findings could have always been odious and nothing more. It was akin to a doctor charged with negligence having a fellow practitioner in his own practice going through his notes, going through what occurred and then giving his opinion. By contrast, in 1964 when the Voyager was sunk by the Melbourne the then Prime Minister Menzies did not ask for a Senate inquiry. He did Thursday, 25 September 2003 Senate—References FAD&T 239 not simply appoint the admiral of the Navy to inquire as to whether something had gone wrong. He launched a full judicial inquiry immediately. We must remember this: when Prime Minister Howard made the comments about whether or not the Australian public would be the judge, they must also be taken in light of a comment that he made on 15 June to parliament: ‘But it is also absolutely essential to take the public with us in any decision that we make. We live in an age of unbelievably high levels of accountability and the idea that policy in areas like defence or foreign policy—or, indeed, any other area of policy—can be handed down like the tablets from the mountain, those days are long since gone.’ I wrote to the Prime Minister on 22 November, because at that stage it appeared that the Blick report was the only report that the Prime Minister or this government was contemplating. I asked the Prime Minister these questions: I am writing to you in relation to my late son Joshua, a beautiful young boy aged 22, who along with scores of other beautiful Australians died on the island paradise called Bali five short weeks ago. Joshua has three siblings and, until 12 October, they had always looked to me to perform one basic parental duty— protect them. Until then, I always thought I could, but now I wonder. Prime Minister, I ask you, not as our nation’s leader but as a father to answer some of my questions. Why did our children die and why have others been sickeningly maimed? Was it because we, as a nation, have pursued a role in the US-led war on terror that we possibly cannot fulfil? I do not need to read the entire letter, but I asked this: Does your government intend to rehabilitate all those young children who are injured and psychologically damaged? I was dismayed when one of my son’s best friends told me the other day that people told him that it was now four weeks and he should be "getting over it". I also asked him this: To what extent was your Government aware of imminent danger to our citizens prior to 12 October? After all, the US was reportedly well aware and had apparently alerted your Government. But your government did not make my son aware. Why is your government torturing certain citizens— and the rest is irrelevant for today’s purposes. The Prime Minister replied within a few days: I read your letter with deep sympathy. I can only begin to understand the grief you feel and the void in your life as a consequence of the wantonly evil act that claimed the life of your son, Joshua. He went on to describe how it was clear that 20 German citizens who died in an explosion in a synagogue in Tunisia earlier this year were the victims of an al-Qaeda attack, yet German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had been publicly distant from US policy concerning Iraq. He FAD&T 240 Senate—References Thursday, 25 September 2003 went on to say that the attitude that I had expressed was not the attitude of the government. He said: I am very conscious that, where appropriate, support services for people affected by this terrible event will need to continue for some time. He never once answered my question: ‘What will the government do to inquire into how my son was murdered?’ This incident overshadowed, but did not diminish, the previous worst peacetime tragedy in Australia’s history. In 1964 I believe that something in the order of 74 sailors lost their lives. In 2002 there are now 91 Australians who lost their lives. This incident was murder. Following the reply, I approached several members of various political persuasions—some of whom I appear before today. I approached Senator Bob Brown, because he had already expressed his views— and he confirmed them—I approached Senator Natasha Stott Despoja; and I approached Mr Kevin Rudd. In fairness, I had also approached the Prime Minister. I had sought an inquiry— I had sought a judicial inquiry; I had sought a Senate inquiry; I had sought at least an inquiry that had an air of independence, free from government intervention. On 24 March, I am acutely aware, this inquiry was debated in the Senate—your Senate, my Senate, my son’s Senate, these boys’ Senate—and I am acutely aware that the vote went 33 to 30 along political lines. I am acutely aware that it was the government’s position that the Blick report—a five-page report that I was given—was all that was going to occur. I have a unique position. I am perhaps the first judicial officer in Australia to have had a child murdered, most assuredly by terrorism, but I believe that I am the first judicial officer that has had to beg, borrow and pay for the privilege of setting up an inquiry into my son’s death. It is the first time that the judiciary has sought assistance for an inquiry from parliament. Frankly, I am disgusted. I am disgusted with the government. I am disgusted with those members of the Senate that voted against this. This is not about lost baggage, this is not to determine Australia spent $400 million on torpedoes that do not fit the submarines that do not float; this inquiry is set up so that my son knows, and will know in the future, how it was that, despite whatever the government says, his elder brother was murdered. I am grateful for today’s hearing, because up until now it has been me—very sadly—who is in the public eye, it has been me calling for this inquiry and it has been me that has, at times, been pilloried. In the interim, when the voting took place, there were no victims there. I was not there, Joshua’s family was not there and, accordingly, a vote was taken in the absence of people—but it is to do with people. I just wonder whether the senators that voted against this inquiry, now having heard the victims give their evidence, would adopt the same position as they did on 24 March. Do they now see this, as Mr Downer saw it on 5 March, as a political stunt? I wrote to Mr Downer and I said this, in another open letter: On the 6th day of March, two separate news bulletins were forwarded to me by members of the Associated Press. The first related to the proposed establishment of a full Senate inquiry into Australia’s security organisations and their knowledge—or lack thereof—pertaining to the risks that we, as Australians, were exposed to prior to 12 October 2002. The second related to your reported response to the same. I believe that you were quoted as saying that, in your opinion, it Thursday, 25 September 2003 Senate—References FAD&T 241 was a "political stunt". I take umbrage with that comment. You have been aware for months that I have been agitating for a full inquiry. … … I am unaware if you have taken the time to speak privately to any other individual apart from myself—whose life was changed irreversibly by the Bali massacre. If you had, you would realise that most, if not all, are dissatisfied with your government’s response to allegations of incompetence and mismanagement. If you suggest—and I think that you do—that Mr Blick’s five-page report represents your government’s complete analysis of events leading up to the greatest peacetime murder of unarmed civilians in Australia’s history, then I am astounded. Its shallowness insults the dead, is an indignity to the survivors and, more importantly, neglects your government’s duty to protect its constituents. The irrefutable fact remains that 88 good Australians died from the most horrific injuries. Hundreds more have suffered immeasurably. This apparently occurred under the watchful eyes of a number of intelligence agencies, including Australia’s.… … …I note the initial British report signals significant faults in their own system. Whilst I concede hindsight is a wonderful tool, our taxpayers should expect more. Your department is not paid to rely on hindsight but to have foresight and respond to it. I have hindsight. I can say that, looking back, my eldest son was ill-advised in travelling to Bali. … … …In light of what is now history, your arrogant assertions that all was well in the intelligence departments must surely be premised on the supposition that Australian intelligence sources were unaware of the existence of those terrorist groups or at least the extent of the problem. If they were not aware, then why not? If they were aware of either the existence or the extent, or worse, then why did they not let on? Are we to believe that all the information presently at our disposal has been gained post-Bali? Are you saying that in the aftermath not one recommendation for a change in processing information has been made in any department involving intelligence gathering or the dissemination of the same? If not, then would you accept that we, as a nation, are justified in feeling decidedly uncomfortable, as a repeat of Bali is almost inevitable? I wrote that letter because it is my intention to protect my son Patrick, it is my intention to protect my wife, it is my intention to protect my son Nicholas and it is my intention to protect my daughter, Eloise. I am a taxpayer. I have a right. FAD&T 242 Senate—References Thursday, 25 September 2003 Sadly, I cannot dissuade, as I attempted to on 16 February, the government’s position on its military stance in the world. But let me say this: everything that I said on that day outside Parliament House on North Terrace I meant. Everything that I did say on that day came true. We have now liberated Iraq. On a daily basis allied soldiers die, and they will continue to die. And who will give a damn? Who gives a damn? It is them; it is not us. But let me tell you this: as I watched in Afghanistan, as each misguided bomb fell on another village, fell on another market, I cringed. As each child had its legs, arms, head removed from its body, I cringed. I wondered how I would feel if I were the father of such a child. I now know. I detest the people that did this to my son and I would do everything in my power to prevent it occurring again. Were it not for my position and my education, perhaps I too may have been involved in reprisals. These are matters that are just seriously overlooked. But, again, I say this: whilst the government maintains its position, whilst we are a supposed new military force in the world, whilst we have invaded three Muslim nations but deny that we are anti-Islamic, we can expect reprisals. And while we can expect reprisals I would feel a damn sight safer if I knew that our intelligence agencies were operating a little more effectively than they were prior to 12 October. But all of this is in a vacuum, because what is not being taken into account is this. We talk about ‘What did Australian intelligence know?’ It is as though we are discussing a few ASIO agents in situ, walking around the streets of Bali. No, it is more than that. When Australia was involved in East Timor the Americans supplied billions of dollars of intelligence hardware. They reactivated satellites. Australian intelligence on the ground could pick up conversations between the military. We watched, we took photographs of butchering that was occurring in East Timor. We have them, but we have not disclosed them. Why? Because we wish to maintain a cordial relationship with Indonesia. Why did we not warn my son—and the boys and the girls that stand behind me—as to Bali? Was it for the same reason—that we wished to maintain a cordial relationship with Indonesia? Was it the case that we did not wish to cause economic strife in Bali? Why was it that in the lead-up to this—between 2001, when we entered into Afghanistan, and 2002—there were 27 advisories given to potential travellers? Why was it that none of those advisories reflected the height of the concerns of ASIO? Why was it that on 3 October in Jakarta, the bulletin had been changed and it suddenly reflected what the Americans were warning as of 26 September? Why did that all occur? Why was it that the 27 bulletins—if we had known they existed—would not have made a difference, because Bali was excluded? Senator Brandis is a lawyer. He would know full well what that means. Once, in any form of law, in any form of legislation where there are exclusionary clauses, that is precisely what they are—exclusionary clauses. You do not have to be a lawyer to know this. When one buys a home there are exclusionary clauses: ‘It will exclude from the sale certain items.’ Everybody understands what that means. In legislation, certain areas are excluded, and that is exactly what that means. I did not need to know about the advisories because I relied, and I still do, on the media. The media are very quick to pick up on changes and the media then publish them. Those changes, published in the media, then alert me and I am free to alert my children. That was why I alerted Josh 30 hours before he died—‘Be careful.’ Had I known for one moment—one moment—that the Americans, that the Australians, were advising travellers to stay out of nightclubs, bars, anywhere where Westerners might congregate, I could have given Josh that advice, too. But I Thursday, 25 September 2003 Senate—References FAD&T 243 was not given the benefit of that. Some people in Jakarta might have been, but I was not in Jakarta; I was in Adelaide. It is not going to be difficult for this inquiry to come to a conclusion that the Australian government seriously failed not only in its intelligence gathering. This is, after all, as I said, the worst tragedy. It is Australia’s equivalent to the 9-11 tragedy. On a pro rata basis, it beats it. The 9-11 tragedy equates to the previous greatest intelligence failing, and that is Pearl Harbor. When you look at it in perspective, I would have thought that something more than a cursory glance of the documents might have been in order. I would have thought for the Australian public to judge whether or not there had been failings that an independent inquiry might have been ordered. But for this inquiry, the Australian public could never have reached a conclusion other than that which was supplied by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s conclusion mirrored Mr Blick’s conclusion, which mirrored Mr Howard’s suggestion, which mirrored Mr Downer’s suggestion. They are all identical. How could a citizen of this country for one moment think that justice was being done? Justice has been denied up until this point in time. I have lost my son, and I do not sleep. I do not like watching my children play sport any more. I am exhausted. What have I had to do for the last almost 12 months? Beg for a little bit of justice. That is what I have had to do. That is a disgrace. Why should this tribunal come down with the findings that I think you will easily be able to— or, better, do that as well as refer this to a royal commission? This is not a bipartisan inquiry. I have watched with interest the manner in which this inquiry has been undertaken, and I know that at least two senators do not even wish to be on it and regard it as a waste of time. So I am never going to be satisfied with this inquiry either. But at least it is a start, and it is a move in the right direction. But for this inquiry, I would never have known the following: the airline upon which my son flew to Bali, Qantas, had, prior to taking my son to Bali, asked a specific question of ASIO: ‘How safe are our fleets and our equipment in Bali?’ Nor would I have ever known the answer: ‘No safer in Bali than in any other part of Indonesia.’ I would never have known that. Furthermore, I would never have known, notwithstanding my attendance at Mr Downer’s office on 21 February, that on 19 June Mr Downer had a meeting with ONA and ONA had told Mr Downer that Bali was a potential target. Much has been said about ONA and many questions have been asked of them. It is guesswork. Yes, it is. But that is exactly what they are paid to do. They are paid to receive all the evidence from ASIO, from any other intelligence organisation, collate it and put an opinion to it. They gave Mr Downer an opinion, but there was nothing specific. That has been reflected in the answers thus far by the government: ‘There is nothing specific.’ I am not interested in what ‘specific’ is—I know and I accept that there was nothing specific—nor did the terrorists who were going to bomb the Sari Club the night before. I accept all of that. I want to know what was not specific. Let me be the judge, let all the truth come out, not just the truth that benefits the government. This is a responsible government. Let it govern responsibly. FAD&T 244 Senate—References Thursday, 25 September 2003 To the government ministers, to the senators, I say this: do not ask what you can do for your party but ask what you can do for your electorate. It is not the party but your electorate that implants you into the Senate. These kids behind me are part of your electorate, Australia is your electorate. When I was admitted to the bar, I took an oath of office. When I was commissioned I took an oath of office, and I have obeyed that oath right through. You members, you senators, likewise took oaths. I would ask that you at least adhere to them. Why is this so important? It is important for a number of reasons. I am entitled to know why my son died. I am entitled to know if anybody put him in danger. By analogy, let us have this situation: one goes on a safari to a zoological park, an outdoor park. If you are transported there and you are attacked by one of the animals in the park, it is not the driver of the bus that may kill you or injure you, and one can only blame the lion, the tiger or whatever it is that causes the injury. But, surely, the blame must also fall fairly and squarely on the individuals that were responsible for you, who knew that could have occurred. Negligence just does not stop with the person who commits the act that causes the injury. Negligence encompasses any person anywhere who owes a duty of care: in this case the Australian government, in this case DFAT, in this case Mr Downer, in this case ASIO. I am entitled to know whether any one of those individuals or organisations slipped up. The Australian public are entitled to know that. The Australian public are entitled to know whether or not certain persons that have the power over the population should maintain that power, or should they be removed? We are all entitled to that. It goes further than that. All of the individuals that have given evidence today—the victims— are, in the normal course of events, entitled to some sense of restorative justice. They were entitled to it from the moment that bomb exploded and they are entitled to seek that justice from any person or any individual, whether it be in Australia or in Indonesia—or in Saudi Arabia, for that matter—and they are entitled to assess, and so am I. We have a situation that they purchased a ticket from a travel agent. They were not warned. The agent is their agent, but they were not warned. They then got on the airline that knew, because they had asked ASIO, but they were not warned. If they did know about—and they did not—the advisories they would not have helped them either, because the advice did not reflect the danger. So just within Australia we have three organisations that may come within the loop of negligence. Then one looks overseas. We have the Indonesian government, who the Australian government was calling reckless in the extreme with their dealings with terrorism, and we have the terrorists themselves. Let us work backwards. There is no possible way, shape or form that any person in this room that is entitled to restorative justice can issue proceedings against the terrorists. They are impecunious. Secondly, let us look at the Indonesian government. Under international law, we cannot issue proceedings against the Indonesian government unless we have the imprimatur of the Australian government or unless they do it on our behalf. Both of those areas are precluded. Therefore, in order for these children to get restorative justice, they have to look within Australia, and that is exactly what I will be doing. But I would not have had a starter had I not had this inquiry. Thursday, 25 September 2003 Senate—References FAD&T 245 I went to Mr Downer on 21 February, the day after my son’s 23rd birthday. I made mention of the fact that the government should look at giving some form of compensation—not ‘from’ the government but ‘by’ the government. There is a difference. I am not suggesting, and I was not suggesting—although Mr Downer thought I was—that that implied some liability. That is not the case at all. Criminal injuries compensation has been in existence since the fifties. It has existed in every state and every territory in the Commonwealth of Australia since the sixties. In 1985 Australia was a signatory to a United Nations resolution not only authorising but suggesting the setting up of a compensation scheme. In the seventies, the eighties, the nineties, attorneys-general—the federal Attorney-General—met and they decided that there was an inequality. We have the perfect instance where that safety net could be set up. We have not done it, so I will be forced into investigating matters further, to take up the matter civilly, and why shouldn’t I? We have had episodes where there has been excess water down at the bay and people’s homes were damaged. They sought compensation. The government paid it. My court is full of this. I oversee, on a daily basis, compensation. For 15 years I have been awarding compensation. Not once in those 15 years has there ever been a suggestion that I am doing something wrong. But now, as soon as I am involved—as I was told the other night, so quaintly—I am seeking money on my son’s head. What that person did not realise is this: I am already entitled to it, but I am not going to accept it until all Australians are entitled to it. There have been a number of victims who have given evidence here today. I challenge you to tell me which ones are entitled to compensation and which ones are not, which ones should be and which ones should not. Should my son receive it but two beautiful girls that were burnt, their lives almost destroyed, not receive it? No. I will proceed. At that meeting with Mr Downer he never told me about the meeting with ONA. He never told me about the meeting between Qantas and ASIO. I have had to extract that from this inquiry. Senators, I said at the beginning that I would probably take a little bit more than five minutes. I have. I apologise. I could continue, but I will not. I reserve the right to make written submissions. I am grateful that you have allowed me this opportunity. I hope that in due course you will come to the conclusion that I have. Let me say this: I started off on the premise that all was right. Where my anger came from was the fact that I knew something had to occur at some time. We had lit the flame and the pot was certainly going to boil over somewhere at some time. By looking at the evidence that you have before you, I think you will reach the same conclusion as I have—that, sadly, the government has been somewhat reckless, and reckless with young Australian lives. Thank you. CHAIR—Thank you, Mr Deegan. Senator STOTT DESPOJA—Thank you, Mr Deegan, for your evidence today. I want to begin by asking you about the meeting that you had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 21 February. You said in your closing remarks that the information in relation to ONA—that briefing, that information about the report, that was provided indicating that Bali could be a possible site of attack—was not made available to you when you met the minister. FAD&T 246 Senate—References Thursday, 25 September 2003 Mr Deegan—No. Present at that meeting was one Mr Kemish, who had flown in from Canberra for the meeting, the minister’s press secretary, the minister and me. No, I was not advised of anything. What I was advised of, however, was that I was incorrect in my assertion that Australians were targeted. I was advised that I would receive, over the course of the next three weeks, a volume of translated confessions. I waited for three weeks and my 22-year-old secretary attended at my chambers as I was about to open the door to undertake a general list. The box was about the right size but the wrapper was not. In lieu of getting a box of translated confessions, I received an urn. I have to say to you that trying to undertake a general list when I have got a funeral urn sitting in my chambers with a clerk crying is a little bit hard. I then waited another three weeks. I finally received a letter from the minister dated 10 April which supposedly enclosed information, as he said that he would, that would suggest that Bali or Australians were not a target. The only problem is that there was no enclosure with that letter, so I basically gave up. But two weeks following that I did receive the enclosure. The enclosure was a one-page letter—I expected something in the vicinity of about 100 pages; volumes—addressed to the foreign minister from the Federal Police. The Federal Police indicated to the foreign minister that, having reviewed their evidence, Australians were not targeted; nothing specific targeted. In subsequent months I have undertaken my own research and I have now received a copy of a translation of Samudra. Samudra, who was one of the masterminds of the Bali bombing, quite clearly indicated that Australians were targeted. It has been a roundabout way of obtaining information in respect to this. Senator STOTT DESPOJA—You mentioned your own research. My understanding is thatyou have undertaken a great deal of research, at personal expense and personal hardship, obviously. Mr Deegan—Yes . Senator STOTT DESPOJA—You have alluded to some of that in your opening statement. Is there anything more you could provide the committee with in relation to the research and any information that you have obtained or discovered that indicates Bali would be the subject of, or that there was a likelihood that there would be, an attack in Bali, be that on Australians or other westerners? Mr Deegan—Yes. About the second week back at work I received a message, a phone call. It was an international phone call. At the time, the caller would not disclose who he was. I was advised by the registrar of the court that an email may be forthcoming. I turned the computer on, located an email and there was an urgent message. It said, ‘Dear Mr Deegan. Please make contact with a gentleman by the name of Fabian Dawson, an editor with a Vancouver newspaper. That person has information very relevant to the Bali bombing.’ For some time I thought that it was Fabian Dawson relaying his own information. It turned out not to be the case, and I have now almost confirmed that the person that sent me the email had no connection with Dawson whatsoever. I then made several phone calls to Mr Dawson in Canada. Finally, he returned my call later that night. Mr Dawson told me that the Australian government were aware of certain matters leading up to 12 October; that they did have Thursday, 25 September 2003 Senate—References FAD&T 247 information; that they did have intelligence reports that specified two targets in Bali, one being the Sahid Club and one being the Hard Rock Hotel. It did not refer to the Sari Club. Following that, I maintained considerable contact with Mr Dawson. At his suggestion I made contact with the United States consulate in Canberra. I was advised that they may have the document. They informed me that they were unaware of the document but that if it did exist it would still be highly confidential. I then received an email which disclosed certain facts from what I believe is a 48-page report. It is a strategic report compiled by all of the intelligence agencies that might, as you would expect, be located in Indonesia. I go back to what I earlier said. The impression is that there are a few ASIO officers sitting in a cafe in Bali trying to get some information. No. What we do have over in Bali and Indonesia is a very heavy American contingent of intelligence resources. What we do have is satellites directed on Indonesia. What we do have is British, French, Israeli—various countries— intelligence organisations all working together. They put together a report and I received a copy of that. That was the basis upon which I made contact with you. That was the basis upon which I made contact with other senators and with other parliamentarians. I was not running without any fuel, if you like. That was an alarming exercise for me, and it quite clearly showed to me that there was more—potentially more—than I had been made aware of. CHAIR—I must interrupt at this point. My main reason for doing so is that the committee formally released yesterday—and I announce this to draw it to your attention, because you may not have had a chance to become aware of it—to the public, a letter of 3 July from Dennis Richardson, the Director-General of Security for the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation. It encloses a letter from James A. Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the US Department of State—that is, the State Department—to our ambassador to the United States, Michael Thawley. It deals with that report in which—I can pass the letter up because it is public—the US government informs our ambassador that there is no substance, basically, in the allegation. You can read it yourself. Mr Deegan—That would not be the first time something like that has occurred. CHAIR—Quite. But I am just pointing that out for the sake of this matter. Senator BROWN—I wonder if you are aware of the evidence yesterday which came from ASIO and ONA. I would like you to be given a full transcript of that evidence, which includes ASIO going away to deliberate as to whether or not they will give this committee some information that was asked for—in camera or at all. I would like you to look at that information and the information from ONA and the information from Mr Blick regarding the Canadian contact you had, so that we might question you about those matters when we get back to Canberra. Mr Deegan—Certainly. CHAIR—Hansard will be available on the web in the normal way very shortly. The secretary of the committee has advised me he will send you a copy in any case. FAD&T 248 Senate— References Thursday, 25 September 2003 Mr Deegan—Just before I go—and if I cannot ask you this, Senators, I do not know who I can ask; I have given up asking elsewhere—I am still unaware of the security arrangements that have been put in place, if they have been put in place, for the commemorative occasion on 12 October. Members of my family, excluding myself, have given an indication that they wish to go. In light of the warnings that have been issued today, I have asked the office of the Prime Minister and I have asked other senior government officials to give me some indication of the level of security. To date I have not received a reply. CHAIR—I cannot provide you with any information on that. We are a parliamentary committee; we are not a government body. It is the government that obviously is the authority that can answer the question. We do not have any information about that. Senator STOTT DESPOJA—Can the committee undertake to ask the government, as a committee request, stating that this is a request that has come from a witness? CHAIR—The committee can undertake to do that. I am not sure about the question of timeliness. Senator STOTT DESPOJA—Can we put it as a question on notice to the government. CHAIR—Any member of this committee can do that. Mr Deegan—I think it is pertinent, because I would hate to be reappearing before you this time next year. Senator BROWN—Absolutely, yes. CHAIR—Thank you, Mr Deegan, and thank you, Pat. ENDS
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