How Downer and DFAT failed to act on ONA and ASIO warnings prior to the Bali bombings - Tony Kevin commentary and SMH article of 19 June 2003, "I don't remember seeing Bali warning: Downer".

Where is our Australian Richard Clarke when we need him ?

I reproduce below the Sydney Morning Herald page 2 news report of 19 June 2003, "I don't remember seeing Bali warning: Downer" , Tom Allard - together with the accompanying illuminating SMH timelines tabulation of "What the Spies Said" and "What the Government Did". My computer skills do not extend to reproducing this in the side-by-side tabled format in which it originally appeared in SMH.

This report makes interesting and important reading now. It was presumably based on the initial ONA, DFAT and ASIO written submissions to the FADC inquiry into Security of Australians in South-East Asia, which are now publicly accessible on the Senate FADC Committee website. See also my recent website commentary:

"Flood, Cook FADC and Deegan on Bali travel advice failure – a preliminary look at the issues (and Brian Deegan’s main testimony)’ - Tony Kevin , 18 July 2004.

Notwithstanding the wealth of publicly available information that ONA and ASIO gave to Downer and DFAT several warnings of terrorism threats to Australians in South East Asia but that the recipients failed to act on those warnings, the impression is now pretty solidly lodged in the public mind that the Bali tragedy was somehow the result of an intelligence agency failure properly to warn the Australian government, so that it could in turn warn our holiday-makers.

The Flood Report as it was reported last week neatly reinforces that impression. Most of the focus of media interest was on the Iraq prewar intelligence – Bali was barely mentioned. This is curious, as 88 Australians died in Bali and none so far, thank God, in Iraq. One would think readers would have wanted to know more about what Flood said on Bali.

Readers would have had to read the fine print of reportage on the Flood Report, to know that Flood’s "case study of Bali" was actually a much more restrictive case study - of how and when ONA and DIO (Flood did not address ASIO) came to recognise the security threat in Indonesia from one particular organisation - Jamaah Islamiah. Flood reports that ONA only perceived this particular threat in December 2001, and DIO did not see it until after the tragedy.

The limited extent of Flood’s question here pretty much got lost in loose reporting and editorial commentary. Flood himself did not lie or mislead in what he reportedly wrote or said on this. It just got blurred in the reportage. To read many of the editorials or expert commentaries, the innocent reader would go away with the general impression that ONA and our other intelligence agencies had failed to warn the government early enough of the terrorist threat to Australians in South East Asia..

We know that this is completely untrue. As the SMH article and as official FADC testimony (on public Hansard record) confirm, ONA and ASIO offered several clear warnings to Downer and DFAT, some of these face-to-face, during the 13 months between September 11 2001 and October 12 2002. Read the timelines below. Tragically, none of these warnings led to any changes in DFAT’s travel advice directed to Australians going to holiday in Bali.

This was policy failure, not intelligence failure. But you wouldn’t know this from reading most of last week’s media coverage of the Flood Report.

One wonders how clearly it will come through whatever public discussion arises from the forthcoming Senate FADC Report on "Security of Australians in South-East Asia", which is due to be tabled by Wednesday 5 August 2004.

Where is our Australian Richard Clarke when we need him? *

* Richard Clarke is the senior US security official who blew the whistle on US Government policy failure to take precautions prior to Sept 11 2001 Al Quaeda attacks in USA.

Tony Kevin, Canberra 26 July 2004

The following article is reproduced with thanks to SMH:

I don't remember seeing Bali warning: Downer

Author: Tom Allard, Foreign Affairs Writer, Sydney Morning Herald 19 June 2003, News and Features, page 2.

The Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, said yesterday that he could not recall reading an intelligence report before the Bali bombings warning that Islamic terrorists regarded the island as an important symbolic target.

The admission prompted the Opposition to step up its attack on the Government over its handling of the Bali warnings.

The Office of National Assessments, which produced the Bali target report at the request of the Government, took the extraordinary step of releasing a minute to dispute claims by one of its ex-employees that it had made a specific warning of a Bali attack.

But the ONA also appeared to undermine one of the Government's main arguments, that travel advisories for Bali had not been upgraded because the ONA had never told it do to so.

In a submission to a parliamentary inquiry, the organisation stressed that it had no formal role in advising on the content of advisories.

The Herald reported yesterday that the ONA told the Government as early as September 27, 2001 more than a year before the bombings that Bali was seen by Islamic extremists as a ``haven of Western decadence" and ``an important symbolic target".

Last June [2002] an ONA officer identified Bali as an attractive target in discussions with Mr Downer. An ASIO report in July [2002] also noted that attacks in Bali were possible.

These warnings were never made public. Until the bombings, travel warnings continued to say that tourist services were operating normally, although there was a warning that further terrorist acts were possible.

Mr Downer has said that he did not receive a written assessment mentioning Bali. Yesterday, he said he could not recall the September 2001 document.

``Do I recall seeing it? No. I mean this is going back to weeks immediately after the events of September 11, 2001," he said. ``Never has the Government received any intelligence that there was to be a terrorist attack in Bali."

In their submissions for a Senate inquiry due to start today, the ONA and ASIO both said they had received no specific intelligence of a planned attack.

But Labor's foreign affairs spokesman, Kevin Rudd, said Mr Downer's explanation was inadequate.

The former ONA analyst Andrew Wilkie, who quit in March over the imminent war in Iraq, said he had viewed a document from an ONA analyst late last year which noted that Bali had been identified as a target. The ONA response was that none of its analysts involved in compiling reports on Indonesia at the time recalled a conversation with Mr Wilkie along the lines he had described.

The Prime Minister, John Howard, said yesterday: ``Look, I could say to you that a certain part of Sydney would be an attractive terrorist target, but if I don't have any intelligence I hardly tell people not to use that facility."

WHAT THE SPIES SAID

September 27 and 28, 2001

ONA says in report that hotels in Bali and Lombok are viewed as "havens of western decadence" and important "symbolic targets", although there is no evidence of planned attacks. ASIO lifts threat level to high and says Islamic extremists in Indonesia see Australia as a "soft target".

November 9 [2001]

ASIO says bin Laden's taped message is a "significant upgrading of Australia's profile" as terrorist target in Indonesia. Australian interests viewed as "extension of the Australian crusader forces".

June to July, 2002

Alexander Downer told by ONA officer in mid-June that Bali, Indonesian province of Riau and Singapore were attractive targets, as were nightclubs, airports and hotels. ASIO report on Qantas notes Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah figures had transited Denpaser airport. Says "neither Bali not Jakarta could be considered exempt from attack".

August 9 [2002]

ASIO warns of co-ordinated terrorist attacks in Indonesia in next couple of months.

September 13 [2002]

ONA says debriefing of terrorist Umar Faruq showed extensive Al Qaeda links to JI network "criss-crossing South-East Asia".

October 10 [2002]

ONA report says further terror attacks in South-East Asia are "on the cards", including US targets in Indonesia. ASIO warns JI planning attacks on Singaporean interests but Australian interests may be affected. Says activity likely focused on US economic interests but could involve action against US allies.

WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DID

October 8, 2001

Australians told to "consider deferring all holiday and normal business travel to Indonesia, excluding Bali". Warning downgraded two weeks later, reference to Bali changed to "tourist services operating normally".

March 28, 2002

First upgrade in travel warning since October, urges "high level of security awareness" and warns of demonstrations. Notes tourist services operating normally, including in Bali.

July 12, 2002

Travel warning re-issued but not upgraded after ONA said information on Bali wasn't specific. New warning notes for first time that bombs had been exploded in tourist areas in past. Says tourist service in Bali operating normally.

August 13, 2002

Re-issued travel notice says for first time that bomb attacks may occur in future. Reference to tourist services operating normally in Bali remains.

September 10, 13 and 20 [2002]

Travel warnings reissued saying there was "ongoing risk of terrorist activity in the region" for first time. Notes risk of further explosions, including in tourist areas but tourist services are operating normally in Bali.

Bali bombing occurs on October 12 [2002].